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TRUST, CREDIT AND COMMERCE  
COUNT SZÉCHENYI’S VISION OF HOW TO BUILD SOCIAL 
COHESION IN 19TH CENTURY HUNGARY1 
FERENC HÖRCHER2 
ount István Széchenyi is arguably the most important figure, the 
intellectual founding father of the reform age in early 19th century 
Hungary. His compositionally unbalanced, but rhetorically strong 
three theoretical books3 at the very beginning of the 1830s caused quite a 
scandal. In them, he tried to collect the major reform steps already suggested 
on the 1790s Hungarian reform diets, but never taken seriously by Vienna. 
His original idea in Credit, however, was to turn the discussion away from 
the political stakes, and try to find common fields of interest for both Court 
and country. The major topic (mainly of Credit) was meant to be the 
development of commerce through institutionalised credit.  
This paper wants to argue that Széchenyi’s idea was not simply a tactical 
move not to confront the all powerful Metternich too early. It is to show that 
a key issue for Count Széchenyi was to try to unite his country, decomposed 
by an outdated feudal constitutional structure and by the “divide et impera” 
strategy of Vienna. His analysis of the causes of social disintegration was 
forceful and relevant – and the cure rather courageous, though adopted from 
the discourse on commerce in the British (more exactly mostly Scottish) 
Enlightenment4, but utilised in a wholly different context (dealing with the 
                                                        
1 Research for this essay was made possible by the interdisciplinary OTKA-project 
Művészetek és tudomány a nemzetépítés szolgálatában (K 108670) (Arts and 
Science in the Service of Nation-Building). Some of its themes were touched upon 
in another paper by this author: István Széchenyi and Metternich: Trust and 
Distrust in the Hungarian Reform Era? presented at the conference Trust and 
Happiness in the History of Political Thought, Central European University, 17-19. 
September, 2014. 
2 Institue of Philosophy, Research Centre for the Humanities, Hungarian Academy of 
Science 
3 Hitel (Credit, 1830), Világ (Light, 1831), Stádium (Stage, 1833) 
4 For the British paradigm, with a special emphasis on Scotland, see the classic: J. G. A. 
Pocock: Virtue, commerce, and History, Essays on Political Thought and History, 
Chiefly in the Eighteenth Century, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985. 
See also: István Hont and Michael Ignatieff, eds, Wealth and Virtue, The Shaping of 
Political Economy in the Scottish Enlightenment, Cambridge: Cambridge 
C 
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Hapsburgs instead of the Hannoverian house), for a rather different purpose 
(to create social cohesion) beside the usual one (of defending civil society, 
initiating social progress and the accumulation of wealth). It was not his 
mistake that it did not work out quite as he wished for – although he, too, 
relied on a rather softened version of the discourse on commerce.  
In what follows we shall first see how the concept of trust was used in two 
British contexts, before turning to the ideas of Count Széchenyi, recovering 
the historical background to his books, and making sense of his forceful, 
successful, although to a large extent rheotrical argument in that context.  
TRUST IN IN THE ENGLISH CONTEXT: LOCKE, MAITLAND AND BURKE 
Trust is one of the key notions of early modern and modern political 
philosophy. For example, in Locke’s famous theory – according to John 
Dunn’s classical interpretation – trust is the most fundamental question in 
politics. 5 Dunn claims that his interest in Locke is determined by the fact 
that he has been aware of the significance of the concept,6  while later 
theorists (Marxists, liberals and even conservatives) seem to have forgotten 
about it. He also claims that the question. „What is the bond of society?” is – 
or rather should be, as modern authors tend to neglect the question – the 
corner stone of political philosophy. Also, he summarizes the Lockean 
answer in a succinct way, already in the introduction to the problem, when 
he quotes Locke’s terminology: „John Locke in his Essays on the Law of 
nature describes fides as the vinculum societatis (the bond of society; Locke 
1954: 212)”.7 At this point we are not yet in the position to explain how trust 
is a condition of reliable social bonds, but one can easily accept this 
conceptual link between them.8 
                                                                                                                     
University Press, 1983 and Christopher Berry: The Idea of Commercial Society in 
the Scottish Enlightenment, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2013. 
5 John Dunn: The concept of “trust” in the politics of John Locke, in Philosophy in 
History, ed. R. Rorty, J. B. Schneewind and Q. Skinner, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, pp. 279-302., 279.  
6 John Dunn: Locke’s „moral and political thinking as a whole (and in my view the 
central burden of his philosophical thinking in its entirety) was directed towards an 
understanding of the rationality and moral propriety of human trust.” (Dunn, 280-81.) 
7 Dunn, 280. 
8 It might be relevant, however, to emphasize that trust is regarded by a number of 
modern theorists as crucial to maintain social cohesion, including Luhmann, 
Fukuyama and Baier. Dunn refers to Luhmann at 281: „Luhmann sees trust as 
central to sustaining a society in operation”. See also Francis Fukuyama: Trust: The 
Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity. Free Press, 1995. Anette C. Baier: 
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Returning to Locke, Dunn lists the key terms of Locke’s discourse the 
following way: “(…) trustworthiness, fidelity, the keeping of agreements and 
promises, and respect for oaths were in this way the bonds of human society, 
what in Locke’s eyes makes society possible at all…”9 This list is surprising as 
it shows an unexpected congruence between the would be discourse of liberal 
democracy with the sort of protestant thought, that is suspected by Dunn to 
lie behind all of Locke’s theory. No doubt, Dunn is right when he points out 
that Locke’s serious doubts about the moral trustworthiness of the 
unbeliever, or atheist is usually left out of the package that interpreters take 
over from the original version of Locke’s account. And if we take that for 
granted one should not be surprised to find that the reference to trust is not 
simply a theological consideration in Locke’s way of thought, it is also closely 
connected to what can be called the „moral” part of his understanding of the 
nature of man. In Dunn’s interpretation although Locke is a firm believer of 
the capacities of human knowledge, in morally dubious situations knowledge 
surely cannot have the final word. Human decision is based on judgement, 
which has no final reasons to rely on. And where the will is short of 
epistemological certainty which could direct it to the right decision, it is 
exactly there that trust becomes important: „All human life is an encounter 
with hazard; and the best that men can do in the face of these hazards is to 
meet them with, as Locke put it in 1659, ’virtue and honour’.”10 In a reference 
to the then (in 1984) recent writing of Alasdair MacIntyre11, Dunn - perhaps 
a bit hastily - connects Locke’s concept of virtue’s function in moral decisions 
with MacIntyre’s „trajectory” of virtue ethics. Dunn’s connection however 
illustrates that trust in political philosophy is not only a remnant of moral 
considerations, it is directly connected to the ancient (classical Greek and 
Latin) as well as to the Christian teaching of virtue. 
Beside this theologico-moral dimension of trust, the term is also rooted in 
a legal background. Trust is a key notion in the context of the traditional 
terminology of common law. Here it is a category which describes an 
                                                                                                                     
“Trust and Its Vulnerabilities” and “Sustaining Trust,” Tanner Lectures on Human 
Values, Volume 13, Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press. 1991. 
9 Dunn, 288. 
10 Dunn, 298. In the letter Dunn refers to, Locke writes: „Men live upon trust and their 
knowledg is noething but opinion moulded up betweene custome and Interest, the 
two great Luminarys of the world… we are left to the uncertainty of two such fickle 
guides… if custome must guide us let is tread in those steps that lead to virtue and 
honour.” John Locke: Letter to Tom (Thomas Westrowe?), 20 October 1659. Locke, 
Correspondence vol. I. pp. 122-123. 
11 Alasdair MacIntyre: After Virtue, A Study in Moral Theory, University of Notre 
Dame Press, South Bend, 1984. 
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important legal institution: trust in this common law legal sense means the 
transfer of property (basically landed property) to someone else who is 
required to take care of it in the interest of the original owner. The classical 
theoretician of trust is Maitland, who regarded it as “the greatest and most 
distinctive achievement performed by Englishmen in the field of juris-
prudence”.12 Scott mentions the difficulty of the German historian Gierke, to 
make sense of the common law concept of trust.13  
One should also consult Maitland’s classic essay Trust and corporation, 
in the recent Cambridge collection of his essays for a critical assessment of 
the views of the state as trust in the English jurisprudential tradition.14 We 
do not have much space here to go into details of the matter. Let us focus 
instead on one example of Maitland only: trust in this legal sense is 
important, in the political rhetoric of Edmund Burke. In his Reflections on 
the Revolution in France (1790) we can read statements like this: “The 
interest of that portion of social arrangement is a trust in the hands of all 
those who compose it; and as none but bad men would justify it in abuse, 
none but traitors would barter it away for their own personal advantage.”15 
Obviously, he uses trust as a normative concept, describing expectations of 
the right way of handling of political communities by political leaders. He 
condemns those “who have betrayed their trust in order to obtain that 
power.” It is for this reason that he talks about the government as “a trustee 
for the whole, and not for the parts”. Relying on this legal terminology he 
talks about “the breach of trust”, and a “renewal of his trust”. In an explicit 
way he identifies executive power (presumably of those responsible for public 
finances and the Treasury) with “pecuniary trusts”, advising: “Those who 
execute public pecuniary trusts ought of all men to be the most strictly held 
to their duty.” 
Talking about the role of political leadership as trust connects two 
different, but interrelated discourses: a legal language is made use of in order 
to explain a political phenomena. But there is a further element to Burke’s 
rhetorical use of the concept of trust: it can be read as a comparison between 
                                                        
12 For this description of Maitland’s position see: Austin W: Scott: The importance of 
the trust, In. 39 U. Colo. L. Rev. (1966-1967), 177. 
13 Scott: Importance, 177., quoting also Girke’s claim: „I can’t understand your trust.” 
14  F. W. Maitland: Trust and Corporation, In. F. W. Maitland: State, Trust and 
Coproration, eds. David Runciman and Magnus Ryan, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2003. Note the editors’ words on the issue: State, trust and 
corporation, In. Editors’ introduction, ix-xxix., xxiv-xxvi. 
15 Edmund Burke: Reflection on the Revolution in France (1790). I do not provide page 
numbers, as I rely here on the following electronic version of the text: 
http://www.constitution.org/eb/rev_fran.htm 
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property and power. When an elected politician takes hold of power, it is like 
taking a trust over from the people to let it create profit for the people, and 
not as dominium over real property in his hand.  
TRUST AND CREDIT – FROM BURKE TO SZÉCHENYI 
It is in the economic direction we would like to proceed, but in order to do 
so we need one final conceptual manoeuvre: to show that trust is 
conceptually closely connected to credit, the key term of Széchenyi’s first, 
pathbreaking volume. In Burke’s criticism of revolutionary measures in 
France, of course, the concept of credit was brought up in connection with 
the topic of how the assignata discredited French currency. But there is at 
least one further dimension to the concept already in Burke’s reflections. He 
talks of the “credit of the government”, in a context where it is obvious that 
what is meant is the authority and prestige a government enjoys, and this 
terminological and rhetorical solution shows that political and economic 
reliability are close allies. Talking about the pre-revolutionary government, 
he argues: “The credit of the ancient government was not indeed the best, 
but they could always, on some terms, command money, not only at home, 
but from most of the countries of Europe where a surplus capital was 
accumulated.” In other words he uses the commercial-financial term credit 
in a political context, comparing this way the (internal and external) support 
of the government to economic credibility, which can be done as soon as we 
realise that a government’s success (no matter, whether we talk about 
political or economic success) really depends on the opinions people have of 
its dealings. 
Trust and credit, therefore, are closely linked to each other. If you trust 
someone, she has got credit with you. The government needs trust from 
those living under its jurisdiction and from the external world as well. 
Without this trust it will not have credit from either side. The same is true 
about the personal ruler: he, too, is in need of credit, and he can only get it, if 
he is trusted. But these are still purely political relationships. For us a further 
dimension is more important, as in his works in the early 1830s the subject 
of this paper, Count István Széchenyi did not want to address the purely 
political question of the age, which concerned Hungary’s constitutionally 
guaranteed, but practically lost autonomy within the Hapsburg realm. The 
old-fashioned policy of grievances turned out crabs in the second half of the 
1790s. Rather, his innovation was to suggest a different track: instead of 
getting lost in a hopeless direct fight with the Hapsburgs he suggested the 
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national elite to turn first towards an economic (together with a cultural) 
regeneration of the country.  
In what follows I would like to show that the argumentation put forward 
around 1830 by Count István Széchenyi, one of the seminal figures of what 
came to be called the Hungarian Reform Era, was based on the simple 
recognition of the close connection between an economic and a political 
discourse of trust and credit. In order to present his relevant ideas to prove 
this thesis this paper will focus on Credit (Hitel, 1930), but also keeping in 
mind Light (Világ, 1831) and Stadium (Stage, 1833). What needs to be shown 
is the particular meaning he associates with credit and trust in these 
writings. My claim is that by referring to the mutual respect between 
members of the nation relying on the terminological framework of trust and 
credit, he not only injects economic considerations into the public debate in 
Hungary on politics, as suggested by George Bárány, when he wrote: “for 
Széchenyi economics was organically connected with the social patterns and 
political conditions in his fatherland.”,16 but in fact aims more directly to 
create by the provoked public discussion the missing social cohesion of the 
Hungarian nation, which he finds disintegrated. In his interpretation one of 
the main causes of Hungary’s underdevelopment was exactly social 
disintegration. In what follows some of the signs will be gathered which 
strengthen Széchenyi’s diagnosis, and then his vision to ameliorate the 
situation by creating trust and credit, and through that social cohesion is 
going to be presented. 
SIGNS OF SOCIAL DISINTEGRATION IN HUNGARY BY THE 1820S 
A simplified traditional view holds that the main cleavage in Hungarian 
politics in the beginning of the 19th century was that between a unified nation 
(consisting of the prelates, the Magnates and the nobility, with some, but not 
much representation of the towns, and a claimed representation of serfdom), 
composing the country (ország) and its autocratic ruler, the Hapsburg 
monarch, in this period Francis I., embodying the crown (korona). 17 
                                                        
16 George Bárány: Stephen Széchenyi and the Awakening of Hungarian nationalism, 
1791-1841, originally from Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1968. 
republished by Sarkett and Associates, Winnetka, 2011. 205. 
17 In Hungarian historiography, this tradition is referred to as the „kuruc” type of 
history writing, named after the concept of the kuruc, meaning „armed anti-
Habsburg rebels in Royal Hungary between 1671 and 1711”. Perhaps typical 
examples are Kálmán Benda’s works. For a general terminological introduction see 
the Introduction in: László Péter: Hungary’s Long Nineteenth Century. 
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According to this narrative the Hungarians have a long constitutional 
tradition which safeguards the liberty of the estates composing ország, and 
they are ready to fight (by lawful means if possible, but with whatever means 
if that is required) to preserve the liberties secured by that very constitution 
even against their lawful monarchs, when they trespass the traditionally 
secured areas. Although certainly this is an important part of the game in the 
period, to make sense of Széchenyi’s efforts in his books of the early 30s we 
have to understand other cleavages and problem areas, as well, which play 
their part to lead to the kind of social disintegration we are talking about.  
This paper presents two of the cleavages and one further problem area. 
These are the following: 
(a) a sharp cleavage within the nobility, and an open conflict with the 
aristocrats, due to the pauperization of the 1820s which hit the 
smaller nobility much stronger then the upper part of the social 
scale,  
(b) the centrifugal force of the county system in opposition to the diet. 
And the further problem is 
(c) the peasant rebellion provoked by the Polish uprising. 
(a) After the commercial prosperity brought about by the Napoleonic wars 
the 1820s turned out to be very hard for both the landowners and the serfs 
farming on their lands in Hungary.18 The boom was naturally followed by a 
bust. Due to the low price of grain landholders had to face serious economic 
crises: they could not realise those returns upon which their financial 
survival depended. A lot of them lost much of their fortune and large 
portions of them had to give up the standards and style of life usually 
associated with those of the nobles in 18th century Hungary. As there was a 
strong sentiment among their circles against commerce and industry, they 
had hardly any chance to adapt to the situation. They had the choice to try to 
move into one of the cities, but in that case they had to except the rules that 
applied to the burghers of the particular city. Some of them turned to one or 
the other representatives of the upper nobility to let him cultivate the 
aristocrat’s land – this was an open admission of losing social ground, as the 
serfs did traditionally. As to the number of those belonging to these 
                                                                                                                     
Constitutional and Democratic Traditions in a European Perspective. Collected 
Studies, ed. by Miklós Lojkó, Brill, Leiden-Boston, 2012. 1-14. 
18 Dobszay Tamás-Fónagy Zoltán: A rendi társadalom felbomlása, In. András Gergely, 
ed.: 19. századi magyar történelem. 1790-1918, Korona Kiadó, Budapest, 1998.  
57-125., 93. 
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impoverished layers of the lower nobility, Mályusz gives the approximation 
of about one fourth of the whole number of the nobility.19  
It is also Mályusz who explains the harsh conflict between parts of the 
lower nobility and the magnates.20 As he reconstructs the story it becomes 
obvious that the court in Vienna was quite successful to divide and rule in 
Hungary: they ordered that as a lot of taxpayers fell out from the normal tax-
paying condition by leaving their lands or grounds empty therefore the 
unpopulated parcels have to be populated as soon as possible, otherwise the 
Treasury’s income will lose, and then the costs of the army will not be 
covered by the tax. If you interpret Vienna’s decision with an extra amount of 
goodwill, you can argue that they were defending the poorest part of the 
population, the serfs, who made up c. 90 % of the whole people21. However, 
the fact is, that the pauperized minor nobility lived among equally bad 
economic conditions, and they were also expected to fulfil their obligations 
as nobles, as well. The upper house of the diet wholeheartedly supported the 
government in this respect. Széchenyi himself gave a speech in defence of the 
government’s intention to tax the minor nobility in 1826, opposing those 
forces (of the liberal opposition) who tried to defend the landless nobility. 
Széchenyi, in this respect, turned out to be a good example of the joint 
position of the table of magnates and the government. The situation already 
shows why Széchenyi needed to try to reach out in both directions: the 
magnates are caught between the Scylla of autocratic Viennese rule and the 
Charybdis of a populist “democratic” liberal opposition, which had to rely on 
the support of the ever poorer quarter of the nobility called “bocskoros 
nemesség”.    
(b) If we want to understand how the lower rank nobility could win over 
the implicit coalition of the magnates and the government, we should 
remember that Werbőczy’s customary law 22  made the tradtional county 
assembly the most important scene of Hungarian feudal politics. The minor 
nobility „lived its social life and political activity within the confines of their 
county. (…) these confines divided the otherwise unified social classes – let 
us add: unnecessarily – into 52 petty kingdom.”23 One can easily relate to 
this phenomenon what George Barany calls „the centrifugal forces 
                                                        
19 Mályusz Elemér: A reformkor nemzedéke, Budapest, 1923. 43-46. 
20 Mályusz Elemér: op. cited, 45-48. 
21 Dobszay et al., 96.  
22 M. Rady, J. Bak and P. Banyo (ed and trans.): I. Werbőczy, The Customary Law of 
the Renowned Kingdom of Hungary: A Work in Three Parts (the Tripartitum) 
(CEU and Schlacks, Budapest and Idyllwild, 2005) 
23 Mályusz: op. cited, 64.  
 110 
dominating the country’s life”.24 If you have 52 different, factional interest, it 
is indeeed hard to articulate a unified political will, as the voice of the ország, 
addressing their king. In fact counties were divided among themselves in a 
number of ways, and their interaction decided the dominant tone in the 
diet’s meetings, where deputies of the counties composed the main body of 
the lower house, in dialogue with the upper house, where aristocrats and 
prelates met to articulate their own view. The two houses, too, had to arrive 
at a meaningful conclusion, before the proposal (felirat) could be sent to the 
king for royal approval. As long as the internal tensions between the lower 
and higher nobility, the county assemblies and the diet lasted, there was no 
hope for a unitary voice in dialogue with Vienna – so long the ‘divide et 
impera’ principle was effective. 
(c) A third element of the social disintegration is caused by an external 
event: the Polish uprising of 1831 against the Russian occupier together with 
the spreading colera epidemic causing the death of about quarter of a million 
Hungarian people created a political tension that threatened to lead to an 
outburst of violence. The peasants’ revolt caused by the tension, the fear and 
the disappointment, strengthened by the clumsy efforts on the side of the 
government and the counties created a new coalition between the peasants 
and those poorer strata of the lower nobility which lost its status within the 
body of the nobility. While this new coalition represented a potential threat 
against the aristocrats, the higher clergy and the central government, it was 
also a potential support for the populist rhetoric of the noble opposition in 
the hands of a talented leader like Lajos Kossuth. This was the rather 
disappointing political context, full of violence, impatience and distrust, of 
the goodwill-hunting of Széchenyi.  
TRUST AND CREDIT AS MEANS TO BUILD SOCIAL COHESION  
IN SZÉCHENYI’S VISION 
It is well-known that Széchenyi’s Credit was inspired by a failed financial 
transaction of its author, and reflects the experience of and conclusions 
drawn from his failed communication with the management of the Bank.25 It 
is also widely known that it had an impact on public opinion which is quite 
unparalleled in the history of Hungarian printed letters. Why and how did it 
                                                        
24 Bárány: op. cited, 220. 
25 For recent views on this transactional failure, see the essays in the collected volume: 
Jólét és erény. Tanulmányok Széchenyi István Hitel című művéről, ed. Sándor 
Hites, reciti, Budapest, 2014.  
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succeed to initiate such movements? There is a debate in Hungarian 
historiography about the myth that Széchenyi was the one who awakened at 
least the thinking part of a sleeping nation. One camp claims that this myth – 
which was shared even by his most ardent opponent, Lajos Kossuth – was in 
fact true. The other side claims, however that there is – at least a latent – 
continuity between the reform diets of the first half of the 1790s and the early 
1830s: (anti)Josephinist fathers and their reforming sons were in fact moved 
by rather similar enlightened ideals and aspirations. 
While this debate seems to be very relevant for a number of reasons, the 
present paper wants to address a different issue, and to claim something 
stronger: that Széchenyi with this book addressed the problem of social 
disintegration in Hungary, and his idea with introducing the financial 
product of bank credit as a realistic device to fuel business transactions 
within the frozen feudal structure of Hungarian society was not so much to 
provoke an industrial revolution and thereby to destroy the social network, 
on the contrary, it was to strengthen social ties and social cohesion.  
Széchenyi is clear from the beginning: when he talks about credit, it has 
two rhetorical levels. First it refers to the financial transaction, but secondly 
it also concerns trust among participants of a political body. He makes from 
the very start a comparison between the trust of the creditor and the credit 
taker and the mutual one between members of a political community and 
their leader, credited by them: “The governments’ trust … of its loyal servants 
makes the nation happy and strong”, he claims.26 He also talks, however, 
about a certain distrust between the different orders, and this is our present 
theme. For it needs to be shown that the concepts of interpersonal trust and 
social credit are closely connected in Széchenyi’s mind (and action).  
The story kicks off with the startling fact that even among aristocrats 
there were cases of serious financial crises in contemporary Hungary. 
Although they might had huge amounts of landed property with enough 
cattle on it to have substantial income among normal conditions, some of 
them went as far as to reach the level of starvation. And the explanation, 
according to Széchenyi, lies in the simple fact that due to the feudal legal 
institution of entail (aviticitas) they cannot obtain credit to secure cashflow. 
However, the author’s real invention is not simply the diagnosis of a self-
defeating institutional structure. His main innovation is to show that a lack 
                                                        
26 In Hungarian: „A kormány…hív jobbágyiba helyeztetett bizodalma teszi a nemzetet 
boldoggá s erőssé.” As I quote Széchenyi’s three books from their electronic 
versions (Hitel, http://mek.niif.hu/06100/06132/html/ 
Világ http://mek.oszk.hu/11800/11842/11842.htm Stádium http://mek.oszk.hu/ 
06100/06135/html/), I do not give page numbers. 
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of credit is present not only in an institutional sense of the word, but in the 
sphere of interpersonal relations, too – in the whole national body.  
Széchenyi identifies a “sad heterogeneity” in his country, and claims: “The 
tensions, distrust and withdrawal among the orders can last for years, and it 
is the saddest, when it is for sure – if not directly, at least – indirectly the 
source of damages, and cannot be stopped any other way but by an artificial 
unification, which is nothing else for the denominations being afraid of each 
other than the sun’s good beams for the aforementioned two cowards.”27  
It is surely relevant, that Széchenyi is a late proponent of the 
Enlightenment – his main ideas were inherited by him from his father, who 
was a Josephinist in his youth, working in the government administration, 
turned towards the oppositional main-stream of the Hungarian diet in the 
early 1790s, and gave up real politics as a result of Vienna’s brutal reaction to 
the provoked operett-conspiracy of the Hungarian Jacobins, in which one of 
his earlier secretaries was also involved, and therefore executed, too.28 István 
took over a lot of the ideas of his father, and remained closely connected to 
the discursive universe of the late Enlightenment, while also inspired by the 
romantic religious enthusiasm of the late years of his father, inspired by such 
members of the Viennese intellectual life in the 1810s as Adam Müller, 
Friedrich Gentz and the spiritus rector of the movement, the hermit and later 
priest of the Redemptorist congregation, Clemens Maria Hofbauer.29 
Although these two intellectual influences (the Enlightenment and Catholic 
Romanticism) do not seem to easily combine, they have been parallelly 
present in the mind of the young count. His illustrative story of the two 
cowards he referred to in the quote above showed that fear is caused by the 
lack of clear sight, the unfortunate consequence of darkness. In enlightened 
fashion he advocates the sun, light or clarity (physical or intellectual), which 
helped the two cowards recognise their own clumsy short-sightedness.30  
                                                        
27 In Hungarian: „…az osztályok közötti bokrosság, bizodalmatlanság s visszavonás 
pedig évekig tarthat, legszomorúbb, ha nem positiva, de bizonyosan negativa 
károknak kútfeje, és nem szüntethetni meg egyébképp, mint mesterséges egyesítés 
által, mely az egymástúl tartó felekezetekre nézve nem egyéb, mint a nap jótévő 
sugára az említett két ijedkezőre volt.” 
28 For an overall assessment of his achievements and failures see: Vilmos Fraknói: Gróf 
Széchenyi Ferenc, 1784-1820, Budapest, Magyar Történeti Társulat, 1902) 
29 For an overview of this Catholic spiritual circle in restoration Vienna, see Katalin 
Gillemot: Gróf Széchényi Ferenc és bécsi köre. Budapest, 1933. 
30 It is not by chance that the next book Széchenyi published was entitled: Light or 
Enlightening Fragments To Set Right Some Errors and Prejudices (Világ vagy is 
felvilágosító töredékek némi hiba ’s előitélet eligazitására) (1831). 
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Now it is obvious since at least Descartes, that the metaphorical 
intellectual light is nothing else, but reason. In the fable of the two cowards, 
too, the two protagonist had a false knowledge about the identity of the other 
– it is only through real and reliable knowledge, that this sort of fears can be 
healed. As soon as they had learnt who the other really was, their fear 
evaporated. The same way, argues Széchenyi, if only people learn each other, 
they will be able to get rid of the short-sighted prejudices against each other. 
“The better people get acquainted with each other, the more perfectly 
disappears the frightful schema”.31 
In order to learn each other better, people have to gather together. In a very 
telling section of his book the count refers to the need of concentration, which 
he identifies as a kind of “artificial congregation”.32 At another place he explains 
concentration as “middling”.33 If we recall his obsession with the British 
Enlightenment, it is obvious from these references that he had in mind a British 
(more exactly, Scottish) conceptual innovation, called in the age commercial 
society. This term designated the last phase (stádium) of national develop-
ment in the famous stadial account of the European process of civilisation 
given by Scottish thinkers, characterised by a social order based on a highly 
sophisticated division of labour, an attention to mutual interests and a 
readiness to work together according to commonly accepted standards.34  
The way Széchenyi presents the issue is based on his scheme of the dual 
notions of natural liberty and social liberty.35 Parts of the first needs to be 
sacrificed (and he uses this term) on the altar of the second. In order to earn 
the most of well-being and happiness, one needs to make concessions this 
way contributing to the creation of society. The power of a nation is 
correlative with the amount of internal war as opposed to conversation. The 
verb he uses is conversation – ‘társalkodás’ –, which has a root in Hungarian 
meaning companion or associate, but it is also the root of the word meaning 
society: ‘társaság’ or ‘társadalom’. He associates a perfected form of 
conversation (társalkodás’ with the most perfect development of social 
liberty. And he also makes it clear that the distinction is used to form 
considered judgement about the level of civilisation of a given political 
community. While native America and Africa are regarded as dominated by 
                                                        
31 In Hungarian: „Mennél jobban megismerkednek az emberek, annál tökéletesebben 
eltűnik az őket rémítő váz…” 
32 „mesterséges egybegyűlés”  
33 „középesülés” 
34 For a classic account of the teaching of social progress, see: Ronald L. Meek: Social 
Science and the Ignoble Savage. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1975. 
35 „természeti szabadság”, „társaságbeli szabadság” 
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internal war among some “miserable” members of the community, the fruits 
of social liberty are to be found in Britain, France, and the German realm. 
This classification is closely linked to the Enlightenment categories of 
savage/barbaric versus civilised, a distinction which tells a lot about the 
sense of cultural superiority of the age. Széchenyi seems to wish to see his 
own nation belonging to the second camp.  
The ideology of commercial society, so characteristic of the British 
Enlightenment, had a deep historical background to it. One denotation of the 
word commerce itself is conversation. As far as its etimology is concerned, it 
is a word which comes from 14th century Middle French, and it seems to be 
used in the context of humanistic discourse.36 As Peter Burke summarised,37 
the ‘art of conversation” was equally a key to success in the Renaissance 
court, in the enlightened Parisian salons, and among the philosophers and 
men of letters of the Enlightenment, who wished this worldly success among 
the ladies of the salons as well. No doubt, clubs and coffeehouses, as much as 
Parisian salons, were the melting pots of enlightened culture and society all 
around Europe. One does not need the high flying theory of Habermas about 
the birth of a public sphere in the age38 to get to the conclusion that a 
constant exchange of ideas made possible by these urban meeting places had 
a benevolent side-effect: reforming social manners. And indeed, the whole 
ideology of commercial society is based on this simple insight. That 
commercial activity has benevolent side-effects: it polishes manners, and 
makes individual habits more humane. In other words, an unintended 
consequence of trafficking is a reconstitution of the social world of the 
estates. 
Now this is exactly the character of commercial society Széchenyi would 
like to exploit. He is in fact following the footsteps of József Kármán, 
contemplating of the present poor conditions of the country, and the 
potential which lies in polishing its manners. 39  Kármán talks about the 
‘beautification of the nation’, when he paints a rosy future through “education, 
beautification, patience – tolerance – in one word, the decoration and real 
                                                        
36 See the Online Etymology Dictionary, at http://www.etymonline.com/index.php? 
term=commerce&allowed_in_frame=0 
37 Peter Burke: The Art of Conversation. Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1993. 
38 Jürgen Habermas: The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry 
into a Category of Bourgeois Society. Cambridge Massachusetts, The MIT Press, 
origonal German 1962. English Translation 1989. 
39 József Takáts also refers to Kálmán’s piece in connection with what he labels as the 
„language of polishing” (a csinosodás nyelve): Takáts József: A csinosodás politikai 
nyelve, In. Takáts: Modern magyar politikai eszmetörténet. Osiris, Budapest, 
2007. 19-21. 
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power of the whole nation is growing more and more.”40 The same way, 
Széchenyi draws a straight line from the lack of credit (in the wider sense) to 
this lack of credit being one of the main causes of all moral corruption and 
spiritual degeneration. “Among such chaffering … how could humaneness 
and civil virtue grow?”41 Which means that the opposite cause might have 
opposite results as well: with credit, more humaneness and civil virtue would 
come. At another locus, as we saw, he wrote about a “sad heterogeneity”, 
meaning the lack of social cohesion, which is the cause of a lack of credit, 
which is the cause of a lack of diligent agriculture and commerce, and that is 
the cause why the Hungarians in general are much less well off.42  
Add to this, that beside being connected to the issues of commercial 
society, Széchenyi’s view is deeply embedded into the modern natural law 
teaching as well, which was to a large extent based on the Aristotelian 
account of human nature, but got both Christianised (in a reformed manner) 
and modernised.43 But Széchenyi’s work on commerce is also an answer to 
the political theoretical question of the debate of the ancients and the 
moderns.44 And this answer is not simply a turn away from the austere 
morality of the ancients as Takáts implies.45 He presents a vision, in which 
an interpersonal mutual dependence is a basic factor of national life, as 
present in all walks of modern life as well, on all social levels, and in all social 
functions: “Let there be trust between married couples and between lovers as 
well, let the friend trust his friend, let a certain credit link citizen to citizen, 
merchant to the ploughman”.46  
                                                        
40 „nevelés, csinosodás, türedelem – tolerancia – egyszóval az egész nemzet dísze s 
valódi ereje pedig nőttön nő.” 
41 „Már ily alkudozók közt… miként nevekedhetik emberség s polgári erény?” 
42 „S mily ellenkező gát ezen szomorú heterogeneitás hazánkban! Mely többek közt 
annak is oka, hogy hitel nincs, és ez, hogy igazi serény földművelés, kereskedés 
nincs, s ez, hogy magát a magyar oly jól nem bírja, mint körülményi engednék.” 
43 See Knud Haakonssen: Natural Law and Moral Philosophy. From Grotius to the 
Scottish Enlightenment. Cambridge UP, 1996. 
44 On this issue, see his contemporary: Benjamin Constant, The Liberty of the Ancients 
Compared with that of the Moderns (1819), In The Political Writings of Benjamin 
Constant, ed. Biancamaria Fontana, Cambridge, 1988, pp. 309–28." 
45 Takáts claims that „This political language is the counterdiscourse of republicanism”. 
(„E politikai nyelv a republikanizmus ellenbeszédmódja”.) Takáts, ibid, 19.  
46 „Legyen csak bizodalom a házasok és szeretők közt, hihessen barát barátnak, kösse 
csak bizonyos hitel polgárt polgárhoz, kereskedőt földművelőhöz.” 
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TRUST IN SOCIETY, DISTRUST IN POLITICS? 
Széchenyi sounds almost like a sentimental utopian at this point. Or at 
least like a simple Christian believer, who takes seriously the message of the 
Sermon on the Mount, or at least the teaching of Christ about our duty to 
love our neighbour. He does not sound too political here. But this is not the 
whole story. He does not mix up society and politics – which is not obvious, 
as the distinction (of political and civil society) is not much older, it came 
once again from Scotland, transmitted by Hegel, at about the turn of the 
century.47 Széchenyi seems to be quite aware of the distinction – which was 
not so difficult in a country, where a foreign invader kept hold of the 
country’s political machinery, as opposed to the hearts of its people. His 
idealisation of a mutually dependent society has a natural limit: it only refers 
to natural society, politics.What we call economics and jurisdiction is 
handled by him a bit differently.  
 
“As we are good Christians, let us believe that each individual is good; in 
questions of money, commerce, and constitution we should, however, 
suppose about everyone the worst – and so we shall be happy on this and in 
the other world. Let us leave those sentimentally to preach who always 
dream about mutual trust, as if we were living among saints. If it were as 
they believe, we would not need neither contract, nor testament, nor 
obligation, and even the Corpus Juris could be given to the flames, as the fine 
trust attracting us to each other would make all these unnecessary.”48 
 
This sounds, indeed, like a rather pessimistic, or sceptical warning, not 
easily compatible with what we have seen so far. But Széchenyi is sceptical in 
connection to a certain area, and there, too, only to a healthy degree, I would 
like to claim. For although his above words might sound like making the 
distinction between society (Gesellschaft) and community (Gemeinschaft), it 
is meant more to distinguish legal or legitimate power exercised over the 
                                                        
47  See Norbert Waszek: The Scottish Enlightenment and Hegel’s Account of ‘Civil 
Society’. International Archives of the History of Ideas, 120. Dordrecht, Kluwer 
Academic, 1988. 
48  „Keresztény jótévőséginkben higgyünk minden emberrűl jót; pénz, kereskedés, 
alkotmány dolgában mindenkiről pedig a legrosszabbat – úgy fogunk ezen s a más-
világon boldogulni. Hagyjuk azokat érzékenyen szentenciázni, kik mindég kölcsö-
nös bizodalomrúl álmadoznak, mintha csak szentek közt laknánk. Ha úgy volna, 
mint ők hiszik, se kontraktus, se testámentum, se obligáció nem kellene, sőt még a 
Corpus Jurist is elégethetnők, mert az egymáshoz vonzó szép bizodalom mindeze-
ket szükségtelenekké tenné.” 
 117 
general public from purely natural relationships between ordinary people. As 
soon as we talk about political rule, or government, there is a disproportion 
of power, and therefore individuals have to look out to avoid the use by their 
rulers of a disproportionately asymmetrical power-relationship. 
As far as the economic side of human relationships is concerned, one 
should recognize here the Roman elements, too, in the contractual 
relationship, and the Roman law assumptions about human nature behind 
legal-economical institutions. There is a need for a minimal amount of trust 
between Roman law partners as well as business partners, but the urgency of 
suspicion is also there. And even more importantly: suspicions are 
depersonalised and institutionalised. If there is a chance of unreliability in 
human relationships, it is useful to minimise the risks of it by providing 
institutional guarantees, in other words the superiority of the rule of law over 
those of the individuals.  Széchenyi’s view is not far away from Kant’s famous 
“gesellige Ungesselligkeit”: a complex commercial society which he hopes 
Hungary will soon become can only be governed by a simultaneity of 
interpersonal trust and institutionalised distrust. 
SUMMARY 
To sum up the point that was made here, about Széchenyi’s views on trust: 
Széchenyi is not simply a religious zealot, who tries to convert his fellow-
citizens to the religion of trusting others. On the contrary: he requires legal 
safeguards, because he is well aware of his compatriots’ fallibility, and he 
wants to have institutional checks on political power because he had first 
hand experience about the provinciality and anachronistic nature of 
autocratic rule in Hungary.49 But he wholeheartedly supports trust among 
Hungarians in what we today would call civil society. In other words, his 
argument is about social trust, and not a blind trust in politics. Which does 
not mean that social trust would not be politically valuable, as well. On the 
contrary, his whole point is to emphasize that even if we should suspect the 
politically powerful, trust has a real political merit, it fuels human exchanges, 
between ruler and citizen, too.  
Commerce partly belongs to the territory of civil society, and partly to 
politics (think about the term political economy), this is what makes it 
possible to talk about it in a political and a non-political tone. According to 
Széchenyi, in a society where there is a high level of trust, and where 
commerce polishes human manners, credit needs to be freed from its 
                                                        
49 About the unequal relationship between a trusting Széchenyi and a cynic Metternich 
I presented a paper, mentioned in note 1. above. 
 118 
constitutionally ordained imprisonment. If this will be followed by demands 
of political reform, it is only too natural: but trustworthy social cohesion 
even in that situation can be a source of energy, and can help to avoid social 
unrest and revolutionary violence. Add to this that by strengthening a 
country’s economy it becomes stronger in its international relations, too. But 
no trust can substitute an institutanl framework of the rule of law, in order to 
safeguard the fair exercise of power in a state. 
